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ABSTRACTS
Mary lane Plumer
APPEARANCE-WAIVER OF STATUTORY SERVICE OF PROCESS IN A
DIVORCE ACTION BY PERSONAL APPEARANCE-Plaintiff filed suit in the Court
of Common Pleas of Summit County, Ohio, for divorce and alimony against
her husband who was in the armed forces of the United States stationed in
California. Defendant was not served in the manner provided by statute, but
several months after the petition was filed, he executed in California and personally filed an answer in which he purported to waive the issuance and service
of summons. The trial court dismissed the petition. Held, affirmed. The court
said that "in actions for divorce, the Ohio Statutes governing service of process
are exclusive and mandatory. In this state, a defendant in a divorce action
cannot waive jurisdiction of his person by a pleading, by personal appearance,
or in any other manner, and thus confer jurisdiction upon the court to hear
and determine the cause. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant to dissolve
a marriage relation can be acquired only by strict compliance with the Statutes
of the State." 1 Tucker v. Tucker, (Ohio Ct. App. 1944) 56 N. E. (2d)

200. 2

Principal case at 202.
Judgment reversed in Tucker v. Tucker, (Ohio 1944) 56 N. E. (2d) 202,
the court saying that jurisdiction was acquired by the filing of an answer, the waiver
1

2
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APPEARANCE-WHERE DEF!'NDANT HAs OBJECTED TO JURISDICTION
OvER H1s PERSON BY PLEA IN ABATEMENT, MoTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
FOR TRIAL OF ABATEMENT IssuE As GENERAL APPEARANCE - In an action
against it on an insurance policy, in which service was made, in pursuance of
an Indiana Statute,1 on the Commissioner of Insurance of Indiana appellant
here, a Missouri corporation doing business in Indiana, appeared specially and
filed a motion to set aside the service and dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction of the person. On denial of the motion appellant filed a verified plea in
abatement covering substantially the same subject matter, requested a jury trial
on its plea, and immediately thereafter filed a verified motion for a change in
venue. The motion was granted and the cause venued to Jasper County from
whence it was moved, on motion of the plaintiff, appellee here, to Starke County.
There, appellant's plea in abatement was stricken out on the ground that his
motion for a change of venue constituted a general appearance and a waiver of
the jurisdictional question. Appellant assigns this ruling as error. Held, judgment
reversed. The statute 2 provides that the issue on an answer in abatement must
be tried first and separately from an answer in bar. At common law issues
of fact were triable by jury and under modern practice a change of venue may
be taken in order to provide unbiased triers. The court said, "No reason has been
pointed out, nor do we see any reason why it does not apply to issues of fact
raised by an answer in abatement as well as an answer in bar." 8 In seeking a
jury trial and change of venue appellant was merely pursuing his remedy by
abatement. General American Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, (Ind. 1944) 54 N. E.
(2d) 944.
CONTRACTS- EFFECT OF FAILURE OF CONTEMPLATED MEANS OF PERFORMANCE ON DuTY TO PERFORM A PROMISE - Defendant, a public service
corporation, engaged in the business of supplying electricity and gas to customers
in the Bristol area, contracted with plaintiff, an agency organized for the purpose
of constructing and renting low-rent dwellings in the City of Bristol, to furnish natural gas to the tenants of plaintiff's projects for all their heating, cooking, and refrigeration for the five years following Septem~er 5, 1940. The
contract provided that neither plaintiff nor defendant should be liable for failure
to receive or deliver the gas as the results of "fire, strike, riot, explosion, flood,
accident, breakdown, acts of God, or public enemy or other acts beyond the
control of the party affected." Sometime previous to the making of this contract
defendant had been a manufacturer and distributor of artificial gas but when
a natural gas supply had been discovered near Bristol defendant had, after a
thorough investigation of its extent and a determination that it was sufficient
to supply all' possible customers in the area for at least ten years, contracted to
buy enough gas to supply its customers then or thereafter to be served in Bristol,
of summons; and entry of appearance. The question of collusion is an entirely different
matter.
See "Voluntary Appearance as Collusion between Parties to Divorce Suit," 109
A. L. R. 893 (1937).
1
Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1940 Replacement) § 9509-4.
2
Ind. Stat. (Burns 1933) § 2-1034).
8
Principal case at 945·
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, Virginia and Bristol, "Tennessee. In 1942 it appeared that the supply of natural
gas, contrary to expectations, was nearly exhausted and defendant pleaded with
its customers to change to some other type of fuel heating. Plaintiff agreed to
make the change in its buildings but did not waive its right under the contract.
Plaintiff brought an action for the cost of the change over. Defendant contended
that first, the express provisions of the contract excused its performance in that
non-performance was occasioned by an act beyond his control and second, the
subject matter essential to performance which both parties used as the basis of
the contract had ceased to exist. The trial court restricted the defense to the
second conclusion and under instructions from the court, the jury refused a
verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed contending that both defenses should
have been rejected and defendant assigns cross error because the .first was not
permitted. Held, affirmed. Impossibility due to the, failure or non-existence of
a certain state of affairs or means of performance, the continued existence of
which was contemplated by both parties as the basis of their contract but not
contracted for will excuse performance on the part of the promisor, unless it.
appears that the promisor has assumed the risk of its continued existence. Housing Authority of City of Bristol v. East Tennessee Light & Power Co., (Va.
1944) 31 S. E. (2d) 273.1
CORPORATIONS CONSIDERATIONS INDICATING DEBTOR-CREDITOR
RATHER THAN PROPRIETARY RELATIONSHIP -The Commissioner of Internal Revenue petitioned for review of a decision of the Tax Court of the
United States, deciding that the amounts of accrued interest payable on nonvoting 7 % Income Debentures of defendant taxpayer constituted interest on
indebtedness deductible under the Revenue Act,1 and not non-deductible dividends on preferred stock. The debentures provided for payment of a sum certain at due date and of interest at seven per cent payable quarterly "only out of
and to the extent of the net earnings of the company," or, irrespective of earnings, cumulative and payable absolutely at the due date. With the written consent
of the holders of sixty-six and two-thirds per cent in principal amount of the outstanding debenture$, the terms could be changed, but not in such a way as to
affect the absolute obligation of the company in respect to the principal or interest. The taxpayer reserved the right to issue other "notes, debentures, bonds
or other obligations of the company." Held, affirmed. The essential feature of
the debtor-creditor relationship is the presence of a fixed maturity date at which
time the holder may demand payment. The fact that annual payment of interest was contingent upon annual earnings does not take the debenture out of
this class. This court did not decide whether a power in the hands of the holders
to change the date of maturity would take the instruments out of the ,debtorcreditor class, but found that the holders had no such power. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. H.P. Hood & Sons, (C. C. A. 1st, 1944) 141 F. (2d)
467.
1 For related topics see, for rights of parties the performance of whose contract
has been interfered with by the war conditions (?r act of government, 137 A. L. R.
II19 (1942), 147 A. L. R. 1447 (1943), 150 A. L. R. 1413 (1944), 151 A. L. R.
1447 (1944); where subject matter no longer available, 127 A. L. R. 1015 (1940).
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CouRTS - PowER OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT CouRT oF APPEALS TO PAss
ON MERITS ON PETITION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF REVIEW - HazelAtlas Glass Company petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals for leave to file
a bill of review in the District Court to set aside a judgment entered in that
court in a patent infringement suit pursuant to an order of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, on the ground that the Circuit Court's judgment had been obtained
by fraud practiced upon it by appellant in that case. After a hearing the Circuit
Court determined that since the fraud had been practiced upon it rather than
upon the District Court, it would itself pass on the issue of fraud. It thereupon denied the petition but granted to petitioner leave to amend the prayer to
ask that the Circuit Court hear and determine the issue of fraud. Upon consideration of the facts, "the court denied the prayer of the amended petition, one
ground of denial being that the court lacked power to set aside a decree of the
District Court after the expiration of the term. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed. In answer to respondent's contention that although
the District Court has the power, upon proper proof, to set aside its 1932 decree in a bill of review proceeding, the Circuit Court does not possess a similar
power for the reason that the term during which the 1932 judgment was entered had expired, it held that the Circuit Court, on the record presented had
both the duty and the power to vacate its own judgment and give the district
court appropriate directions. Equitable relief against fraudulent judgments is
a judicially devised remedy fashioned to relieve from hardships which arise
from application of the court-made rule that judgments should not be disturbed
after the term of their entry has expired. When the judgment sought to be
relieved from has been acted upon by -the appellate court, permission to file a
bill of review must be sought in the appellate court. The petition must contain
the necessary averments supported by acceptable evidence, and the appellate
court may, in the exercise of reasonable discretion, reject the petition in which
case a bill of review cannot be filed in the lower court. If the court has the
power to pass upon, and hence grant or deny, it would be a cumbersome and
dilatory procedure if, after the Circuit Court had determined that relief must
be granted, the case had to be sent to the District Court for decision, especially
where the alleged fraud was on the Circuit Court. Justice Black in his dissent
pointed out that the decision of the majority repudiated the unbroken rule of
decision with respect "to finality of a judgment at the expiration of the term;
• • • to jurisdiction of an appellate court to try issues of fact upon evidence
and ... to the necessity for resorting to a bill of review to modify or set aside
a judgment once it has become final." 1 He said that if relief on equitable
grounds was to be obtained, it should be sought in a formal suit in a court of
first instance. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., (U. S. 1944)
64 S. Ct. 997 .2
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES -APPLICATION OF ORDINARY FRAUD LAW
IN CASE OF VAN SwERINGEN CREDITORS AGAINST BALL - Ohio SuperinPrincipal case at 1005.
On problem of power of lower court to set aside on ground of fraud, judgment
entered to mandate of, or affirmed by, a reviewing court. 146 A. L. R. 1230 (1943).
1

2
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ten dent of Banks in charge of liquidation of The Union Trust Company of
Cleveland and as trustee for certain other creditors of the partnership of 0. P.
& M. J. Van Sweringen, late railway and real estate magnates, brought an
action in the Fede.ral District Court at Indianapolis against George A. Ball
(of the Muncie Fruit Jar Balls) and the George and Frances Ball Foundation
to rec~ver the value of 8250 shares of the common stock in Midamerica Corporation allegedly converted by the defendants. The vast holdings accumulated
by the Van Sweringens were controlled through two principal holding companies, Vaness and Cleveland Terminals Building. In 1930 Vaness and C.T.B.
borrowed a total of $39,500,000 from two syndicates of banks headed by
Morgan, pledging as security for their notes, ·stocks which had been held as
collateral by Cleveland banks, the original Cleveland loans being repaid with
money borrowed in Cleveland by the partnership using Vaness stock as collateral. Among the stocks pledged to Morgan were 2,000,000 common shares
of Allegheny Corporation, the holding company for the railroads of the Van
Sweringen System. Being unable to repay the Morgan loan May 1, 1935 when
the notes came due and unable to get further extension of time or credit there,
the pledged collateral was sold at public auction. The only concession to the
Van Sweringens was the grouping of securities so that they could bid separately
on those groups essential to control of their railways. With G. A. Tomlinson,
a director of the Midland Bank which was a Cleveland creditor as well as a
member of the Morgan syndicate, the Van Sweringens interested Ball. Midamerica was incorporated under the laws of Ohio September 28, 1935. Ball and
Tomlinson subscribed $2,000,000 for 20,000 shares of common stock. A few
days later the Midland Bank took over part of Tomlinson's interest. Ball later
bought out the Midland and most of the Tomlinson interest. No money was
subscribed by the Van Sweringens but they voted 8250 shares (55%) of the
common stock under an agreement by which the stock was to be put in escrow
with an unassignable option to the Van Sweringens to purchase when they had
satisfied five of the six directors that all claims enforceable against them had been
"paid or adjusted." Midamerica, on September 30, 1935 bought from Morgan
that part of the collateral necessary for control of the railroads for $3,121,000, the
money subscribed by Ball plus additional funds borrowed from a trust company.
The management of the railroad interests remained with the Van Sweringens until
the death of the survivor of them in November, 1936. In December, 1936 a
receiver was appointed for the partnership and on April 1, 1937 he notified
Ball of his rights in the partnership's option to buy the 8250 shares of Midamerica. On that day, however, Ball had transferred this stock, with the rest
that he held, . without consideration and with knowledge of the receiver's
claims, to the George and Frances Ball Foundation. Ball contended that the
Van Sweringens had no interest in the stock beyond their option to buy which
expired with the- death of O. P.; that plaintiff's claim was unenforceable because based upon the Van Sweringens' right to compensation for services which
were found to be in violation of their fiduciary duty to V ant:ss 1and C. T. B.1 ;
1 Before judgment was entered by the district court in this action, it had been
determined in an action by Vaness and C. T. B. against Ball and the foundation that
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that plaintiff was estopped from maintaining his action because one of the four
creditor banks represented by plaintiff had become the owner of 754¼ shares
of Midamerica common, and had sold them at a profit of $523,000. The other
three banks had acquiesced in this action and had profited by it in that they
were obligated to make up the deficiency when the insolvency proceedings of
the fourth were wound up, and the obligation was reduced pro tanto by this
profit. The court found that the 8250 shares of Midamerica were the property of
the partnership held in trust for it, that the condition precedent to acquisition of
ownership expressed in the agreement was designed to hinder, delay and defraud
the partnership creditors, that Ball had been guilty of conversion when he transferred 14,050 shares of Midamerica to the foundation, that Ball, having no
interest in the Vaness and C. T. B., could not assert in their defense, the
Van Sweringens' breach of fiduciary duty to those companies, but that
the effect of the breach was to reduce the value ~f the 8250 shares by 55%
of the amount paid by the foundation in settlement of the costs,2 and that
there was no estoppel present. The court entered judgment for plaintiff for
$3,664,616. HeU, modified and affirmed as modified. The district court should
have permitted a deduction from the recovery of 55% of the amount paid for
Midland's Midamerica stock. The principle of equitable estoppel which defendant sought to invoke has its proper function in the prevention of fraud,
actual or constructive. There was no fraud on the part of the creditors, but
Midland, by electing to treat the rights of the receiver terminated in 754¼
shares which it held, was barred by real estoppel from claiming now that the
re9!iver had such rights. The judgment is reduced by $343,750. Cook v. Ball,.
(C. C. A. 7th, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 423.
HABEAS CoRPUs-MAY A JuDGMENT OF CONVICTION BY A CouRT
HAVING JURISDICTION BE CHALLENGED ON HABEAS CORPUS ON GROUND
THAT DEFENDANT W As DENIED DuE PROCESS OF LAw? - One Whitman
was convicted in a court of general jurisdiction of manslaughter in the first
degree and was sentenced to imprisonment in Great Meadow Prison. Thereafter he applied for a writ of habeas corpus charging that he had been deprived
of his liberty without due process of law, in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The trial court dismissed the writ
without giving relator an opportunity to prove the truth of his allegations. The
appellate court affirmed 1 and this court denied permission to appeal,2 and ruled,
on relator's appeal as of right 3 that relator is not entitled to habeas corpus in
this case because the New York Legislature has provided that the writ is not
the Van Sweringens had breached their fiduciary duty to plaintiffs and the suits were
settled by payment by the foundation of $662,500 to Vaness and C. T. B.
2
See note 1.
1

People ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 263 App. Div. 908, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 29
(1942).
2
Permission was sought under N. Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill, 1937) § 589.
8
N. Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill, 1937) § 588 provided that if the construction of the Constitution of the State or of the United States was directly involved, an
appeal would lie as of right.
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available where the prisoner "is detained by virtue of the final judgment or
decree of a competent tribunal of civi1 or criminal jurisdiction." 4 The Supreme.
Court of the United States granted certiorari 5 and, upon the determination that
under the recently decided case of Lyons v. Goldstein 6 there was another
remedy available to relator, that court, without deciding whether habeas corpus
could be used as an alternative or cumulative remedy, vacated the judgment
and remanded the proceeding to the State Supreme Court for "its determination, in the light of that decision [Lyons v. Goldstein] and for such further
or other proceedings as may be deemed advisable." 7 The motion on behalf of
the varden of Great Meadow to dismiss the writ after the cause had been
remanded to the state court was denied. He then applied to the Appellate
Division for an order prohibiting the Supreme Court of the State of New York
"from proceeding to trial or adjudication of issues of fact now arising or hereafter to arise upon the petition in the habeas corpus proceeding." The application was denied, the court expressing the view that coram nobis was not an
exclusive remedy for imprisonment in violation of constitutional rights. Held,
order reversed and application for prohibition granted. Where a prisoner has
been deprived of his liberty without due process, the state must accord him a
remedy in its courts to obtain redress of the prohibited wrong. The writ of
habeas corpus is the traditional process devised to safeguard the rights of persons
deprived of liberty. At common law, however, the writ was not available in
cases where the prisoner was detained under a conviction and sentence by a court
having jurisdiction of the cause. This limitation is expressed in the New York
statute. Although the "common-law principle does not apply in full force where a
court •.. has failed in the course of i trial to observe the requirc:!ments of due
process," 8 imprisonment is unlawful only if the prisoner cannot find a remedy
in an appropriate proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction. The relater
had such a remedy in its right to move to vacate the judgment and to be
granted a new trial. Morhous v. Supreme Court of New York, (N. Y. 1944)
56 N. K (2d) 79.
INSURANCE -WHAT Is A FIRE Loss WITHIN THE MEANING OF CovERAGE CLAUSE IN A FIRE INSURANCE PoLicY? -Appellee operated a grain
elevator where there was stored undried corn which had to be moved regularly.
in order to prevent deterioration or possible spontaneous combustion. As the
result of an explosion and fire within the elevator, the machinery employed to
move the grain was damaged and although appellee used due diligence in the
repair or replacement of the machinery, the grain could not be moved for six
or seven days and was ther<:by damaged by deterioration. On the date of the
fire appellee held two insurance policies issued by appellant, one insuring the
corn against all direct loss or damage by explosion, and the other insuring it
against all direct loss or damage by fire. Appellee recovered on these policies
N. Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill, 1937) § 1231.
New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 317 U. S. 615, 63 S. Ct. 70 (1942).
6
290 N. Y. 19, 47 N. E. (2d) 425, 146 A. L. R. 1422 (1943).
7
Pri~cipal case at 82.
8
Principal case at 82.
4

5
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in the court below for the loss sustained. Appellant contends that the judgment
is erroneous because (I) the loss resulted from causes which were remote and
consequential while the policy covered only direct and immediate damages or
losses and ( 2) appellant was expressly exempt under the terms of the policy
from liability for loss from interruption of business or manufacture. Held,
affirmed. ( I )To determine whether the loss was a direct one under the terms of
the policy requires the application of the doctrine of proximate cause. From
the fact that the fire was responsible for the damage to the machinery, and but
for that damage, the corn would not have deteriorated, and from the absence
of any denial that the insure! knew, at the time the policies were issued, that
damage to the corn would inevitably flow from prolonged failure of the
machinery to function, it may be concluded that the damage to the corn proximately resulted from the fire. ( 2) The losses sustained were not expressly excluded from the policies' coverage by the clause relied upon by appellant, since
that clause was meant to exclude damages claimed under a loss of profits theory.
Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc., Ltd. v. Board of Commissioners of Port of New
Orleans, (C. C. A. 5th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 600.
JorNDER oF PARTIES AND CAusEs oF AcTION-REPREsENTATIVE Surrs--JorNT AcrroN BY BoNDHOLDERS FOR AMOUNTS oF SEPARATELY HELD BoNDS

- The makers of seventy-two bonds secured by a mortgage made an agreement with the trustee (all bondholders approving and consenting) that the
mortgage might be foreclosed, and that, if the makers did not make certain
payments, the trustees, or any individual bondholder,. should "be privileged to
thereupon proceed personally" against the makers "as though this agreement
had not been made." The makers having defaulted, some thirty of the bondholders brought an action for money judgments suing on behalf of themselves
and all other bondholders who should come in as plaintiffs. The defendants
demurred to the complaint on the ground that several causes of action were improperly united therein. The demurrer was over-ruled. Held, affirmed. Under
sections 7406 and 7466 of the code,1 the named plaintiffs are entitled to bring
their action on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The action
here arose out of the agreement which was the subject in which all plaintiffs
had an interest. The joined plaintiffs have the interest in the relief required by
section 7403,2 the relief demanded being "identical" except as to amount.
To permit such an action not only reduces costs to the plaintiffs, but prevents
a multiplicity of suits. Two judges dissented on the ground that the plaintiffs
1
N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 7406 provide that " . . . when the question
is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole."
Section 7466 provides that the causes may be united where they all arise out of the
same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject matter, provided
that the causes so united must "affect all the parties/'
2
N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) § 7403 provides that "All persons having an interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may be joined
as plaintiffs except as otherwise provided in this chapter."
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did not ·have an interest in the subject of the action, the action being on the
bonds and not on the agreement, and that they did not have an interest in the
relief demanded as required by the code. Bonde v. Stern, (N. D. 1944) 14

N. W. (2d) 249.8
LABOR LAW-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST PICKETING WHERE UNDERTAKEN TO COERCE EMPLOYER INTO PAYING UNION INITIATION FEES FOR
EMPLOYEES REGARDLEss OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY WISHED TO JoINPlaintiff is in the business of selling gasoline and fuel oil to dealers and consumers in Washtenaw County, and has in its employ eight truck drivers.
In the course of a campaign to organize truck drivers in the petroleum industry
in Ypsilanti in that county, defendant, A. F. of L. local, solicited plaintiff's
truck drivers for membership and found them unwilling to join except upon
the condition that their employer pay their initiation fee of $27.50 per man.
Upon plaintiff's refusal to meet with this demand, defendant established a picket
line at plaintiff's Ypsilanti plant and thereby partially deprived the plaintiff of
his supply of oil and gasoline. There was no ·evidence of any dispute between
plaintiff and his employees or of any dissatisfaction on their part with wages,
hours or working conditions. The union's position was that if all truck drivers
were to become members, it would facilitate getting better working conditions
and more money for all. The trial court granted plaintiff an injunction to restrain defendants from maintaining a picket line at plaintiff's Ypsilanti plant
on the ground that no labor dispute was present. Held, affirmed. A labor union
has the right to make known the fact of a labor dispute by peaceful picketing,
even when there is no dispute between the particular employer and his employees;
the right exists if the economic interests of the employees engaged in the same
industry are affected. But if the objective to be obtained by such picketing
were not a lawful objective, then the picketing itself would be unlawful and
could be enjoined. Whether or not the picketing here was unlawful is a question of fact. "The testimony is convincing that defendant's real objective was to
compel plaintiffs to put their drivers in defendant union by paying their initiation
fees, regardless of whether or not the drivers wished to join. This was not a
lawful labor objective.m Silkworth v. Local No. 575, .IJ.. F. of L., 309 Mich.
2
746 (1944).
LABOR LAW - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPROPRIATION
Acr - STABILIZATION OF LABOR CONDITIONS UNDER -The National Labor
Relations Board, upon charges made by an affiliate of the C. I. o:, issued a
complaint against respondent and upon .finding that the Alliance, the company
union with whom respondent had had an agreement for nearly .five years, had
See William Wirt Blume, "The 'Common Question' Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits," 30 M1cH. L. REv. 878 (1938).
8

1

Principal case at 758.
See Lennart Larson, "May Picketing be Enjoined," 22 TEX. L. REv. 392
(1944); Arthur Lathrop, "Labor Law-Objective Test for determining the Legality
of Labor Activities," 41 M1cH. L. REv. 1143 (1942), and 149 A. L. R. 452 (1944).
2
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been instigated and dominated by the company in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act,1 the board, on December 3 I, I 942, ordered respondent to cease
and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices found, to withdraw all
recognition from and completely disestablish the Alliance and to post appropriate
notices. The board petitioned this court to enforce its orders and respondent
prayed that the petition be denied because under the National Labor Relations
Board Appropriation Act of I 944 2 the proceeding is outlawed. The act provides
that no part of the funds appropriated should be used in connection with a:
complaint case arising over an agreement between management and labor which
has been in existence for three months or longer without complaint being filed,
provided that for three months a notice shall have been posted indicating the
place at which a copy of the agreement could be inspected by interest~d persons.
Held, affirmed. The court said that the purpose to be achieved by the rider to
the act was "stabilization of labor conditions, particularly the elimination of
jurisdictional disputes between unions," but this purpose was sought to be
achieved, not by a substantive change in the act, depriving the National Labor
Relations Board of jurisdiction, but by a limitation on appropriations. The
case was decided, however, on the consideration that the term "complaint case"
applied only to the proceeding ending with the decision of the board, and not
extending to enforcement or review petitions in' the courts. There is nothing
in the act to indicate that funds may not be used in connection with such petitions, certainly when the proceedings were pending in the federal court at the
time of the passage of the Appropriation Act. National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, Inc., (C. C. A. 9th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 794.
'

ToRTS--LIABlLITY oF A LANDOWNER To CHILD TRESPASSER-Plaintiffs

sought damages for the death of their son, aged three years, nine months, who
drowned in a reservoir on land owned by defendant. The reservoir· had been
maintained for many years in a well populated residential district where there
wer~ many children. It was surrounded by a seven foot six inch fence and on
the premises were posted "no trespassing" signs. Nevertheless, it was found by
the court below that children played there almost daily, and that boards were
frequently missing from the fence, and it was found that defendant company
is chargeable with knowledge of these facts since its employees visited and inspected the reservoir twice each day. On appeal from a refusal by the court
below to enter judgment for defendant n.o.v. or grant a new trial, held,
affirmed. The reservoir was a dangerous body of water because of its location,
and children were permitted to play in and near it. Under these circumstances,
it is the duty of the landowner in the use of his land to use ordinary care not to
injure such trespassers. He must not create, or fail to obviate, risks reasonably
tending to cause injury. Defendant company indicated its awareness of the
danger by erecting a fence, but it failed in its duty of ordinary care wh.en it
permitted the fence to fall into a condition of disrepair. Altenbach v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., (Pa. 1944) 37 A. (2d) 429.1
l
2
1

29 u. s. C. (1943) §§ 157, 158 (1), 158 (2}.
57 Stat. L. 515 (1944).
On the subject of liability of a landowner to a child trespasser see 36 A.L.R. 34
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TRADE RESTRAINTS -APPLICATION OF FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LEGISLATION TO THE FoRCED ELIMINATION FROM BusINEss OF INTERSTATE CARRIER

- Plaintiffs brought an action against defendant labor union officers and
members to recover triple damages for alleged conspiracy in violation of the
-Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The facts found by the district court were that plaintiffs had been under contract to transport produce and foodstuffs by motor
truck for the A. & P., 80 to 85 per cent of the transportation being interstate;
that as a result of a strike of the A. & P. truckers and haulers called by the
union, A. & P. entered into a closed shop agreement with the union, and notified the employees of all contract haulers that they must become members.
Plaintiffs attempted to negotiate:; an agreement with the union, and its employees
attempted to join but both negotiation and admittance were refused. A. & P.
and Sterling Supply Co. for whom plaintiff subsequently contracted to do hauling, cancelled their contracts for no other reason than that plaintiffs were nonunion. The plaintiff'~ business was destroyed by reason of defendant's refusal
to admit plaintiff's employees into the union. Held, the district court's deter, mination that plaintiffs had failed to show a cause of action under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act is affirmed. "Congress did not intend by enacting the Sherman
and Clayton Acts to prohibit each and every restraint upon interstate commerce.
It sought to prevent only those restraints upon free competition in business or
commercial transactions which tend to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market in goods or services to the ·detriment of the public." 2
The interstate business of the A. & P. and the Sterling Supply Company was not
decreased by the fact that plaintiffs were forced to go out of business. Hunt v.
Grumbach, (C. C. A. 3d, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 902.3
at 164 (1925); 39 A.L.R. 486 at 489 (1925); 45 A.L.R. 982 at 990 (1926); 53
A.L.R. 1344 (1928); 60 A.L.R. 1444 (1929); 29 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1931); 30
MICH. L. REV. 477 (1932); 41 MICH. L. REV. 766 (1943).
1
2
3

15 U.S. C. (1941) §§ 1-7, 15.
Principal case at 903.
For an interpretation of the Sherman Act see 128 A. L. R. 1044 (1940).

